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I. INTRODUCTION 
A significant percentage of scholarly economics articles, and a far 
higher percentage of scholarly Law & Economics articles, focus on the 
economic or allocative efficiency1 of the non-government or government 
choices they investigate—i.e., on the difference between the equivalent-
dollar gains a relevant choice confers on its beneficiaries and the 
* John B. Connally Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. (Cornell Univ.); Ph. D.
(Economics) (London School of Economics); L.L.B. (Yale Law School); M. Phil. (Oxford Univ.).  
1. I sometimes substitute the expression “allocative efficiency” for “economic efficiency” to 
remind readers that the concept is a technical term—in particular, to combat the mistaken tendency 
of economists and their readers to assume that increases in economic efficiency are morally 
valuable in themselves and, indeed, that choices that increase economic efficiency are always 
morally desirable.  
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equivalent-dollar losses it imposes on its victims.2 Economists have 
never tried to assess any choice’s impact on economic efficiency by 
identifying all or a random sample of the choice’s winners and losers 
and estimating these parties’ respective equivalent-dollar gains and 
losses. In part, this fact reflects the incentives that the 
beneficiaries/victims of any choice have respectively to exaggerate the 
magnitude of the equivalent-dollar gains/losses it would confer/impose 
on them (to the extent that their doing so increases the probability that 
any government choice in question will be made/rejected or any non-
government choice in question will be allowed/prohibited). And in part, 
it reflects the prohibitive cost and difficulty of estimating the gains and 
losses that individual winners and losers experience through any method 
that does not rely on their testimony. The impracticability of this 
approach to assessing a choice’s economic efficiency has led economists 
to base their economic-efficiency assessments on Welfare Economics 
propositions that relate the impact of a choice on economic efficiency to 
its impact on the number and magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in 
the economy—i.e., of the various types of “imperfections” whose 
individual exemplars could cause economic inefficiency in an otherwise 
Pareto-perfect economy (see discussion below). Although this general 
approach is almost certainly best, the particular Welfare Economics 
proposition on which economists have relied, and overwhelmingly 
continue to rely, is wrong. 
The vast majority of economists base their approach to economic-
efficiency assessment on the assumption that the fact that the economy 
will contain no economic inefficiency if it contains no Pareto 
imperfections (no imperfections in seller competition, no imperfections 
in buyer competition, no externalities, no taxes on the margin of income, 
no relevant imperfections in the information available to a resource 
allocator [resource-allocator sovereignty], no failures to maximize by 
principal resource allocators [given the information that is available to 
them] and no [critical] buyer surplus) has two critical implications: (1) 
any choice that reduces the number or magnitude of the Pareto 
imperfections in an economy will tend to reduce the amount of 
2. The text refers to equivalent-dollar gains and losses rather than to dollar gains and losses 
because many of the relevant effects not only are not direct monetary effects but, in some instances, 
also cannot be capitalized by the person that experiences them. Take, for example, the equivalent-
dollar gain that the owner of swampland who values it positively (for sentimental reasons) despite 
the fact that its market value is zero obtains from an environmental policy that cleans up the water 
in the swamp and/or the air over the swamp. If the policy does not improve the property sufficiently 
for it to have a positive market value post-policy, this winner will not be able to capitalize his 
equivalent-dollar gain. 
2
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economic inefficiency in that economy even if it does not eliminate all 
Pareto imperfections in the economy and (2) any choice that increases 
the number or magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in an economy will 
tend to increase the amount of economic inefficiency in that economy. In 
making this assumption, these scholars ignore one or both of the 
following: (1) the related facts that (A) the Pareto imperfection that the 
policymaker is in a position to reduce or eliminate (that the economic-
efficiency analyst is assuming could be reduced or eliminated) is not the 
only Pareto imperfection in the economy and (B) the economy would be 
Pareto-imperfect even if the Pareto imperfection in question were 
eliminated and/or (2) the central lesson of The General Theory of 
Second Best—viz., since in general any Pareto imperfection one can 
eliminate will be as likely to counteract as to exacerbate the net joint 
effect of the Pareto imperfections that remain, there is no general reason 
to believe that the fact that a choice will reduce the number or magnitude 
of the Pareto imperfections in an economy will even tend on that account 
to increase economic efficiency if it will not eliminate all Pareto 
imperfections in the economy.3 In Part II, this Article will describe The 
General Theory of Second Best and its central point. In Part III, I will set 
forth a twenty-nine step protocol for estimating the economic efficiency 
of any given choice. In Part IV, I will discuss the economic efficiency of 
3. For a detailed critique of a wide variety of canonical economics and Law & Economics
articles and bodies of literature that execute analyses of the economic efficiency of the policies on 
which they focus on the assumption that The General Theory of Second Best can be ignored—i.e., 
on the implicit assumption either that the Pareto imperfection that the policy in question targets is 
the only (relevant) Pareto imperfection in the economy and/or that the other relevant Pareto 
imperfections the relevant economy contains perfectly counteract each other’s relevant effects—see 
RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND 
RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 271-338 (Yale University Press, 2008). For a critique of the 
various arguments that economists who acknowledge the existence of The General Theory of 
Second Best allege justify their and the profession’s ignoring it, see id. at 338-42. I should add that 
the General Theory of Second Best also applies when the maximand is something other than 
economic efficiency. For example, if one makes the contestable assumption that the point of a legal 
trial is to discover the truth of the matter and also makes the contestable assumption that truth would 
be discovered if the trier-of-fact were ideal and all possibly-relevant evidence were introduced at 
trial, a second-best argument might lead to the conclusion that, when actual triers-of-fact (say, 
juries) are imperfect, outcomes would be improved if certain categories of evidence were deemed 
inadmissible. Or, if the distributive optimum were that all relevant creatures have the same, 
meaningful opportunity to do X or the same amount of resources (measured by their allocative value 
in their alternative uses) and one could in each case develop a set of sufficient conditions for the 
achievement of either of these possible distributive optima, in a world in which one or more 
members of the (different) sets of optimal conditions for the achievement of either optimum will not 
be fulfilled, one might be able to make a second-best argument for failing to fulfill one or more of 
the other members of the different sets of sufficient conditions for achieving one of the optima in 
question.  
3
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egalitarian wealth-redistribution policies in a way that reflects The 
General Theory of Second Best and conclude that such redistributions 
would be far more economically efficient than economists tend to 
assume—indeed, in my judgment, would probably be economically 
efficient, all things considered. Part V contains a brief conclusion. 
II. A NON-ECONOMIC AND ECONOMIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE CENTRAL
POINT OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST 
This Part uses a non-economic example and then an economic 
example to illustrate The General Theory of Second Best’s central, 
negative conclusion that, once one or more members of a set of 
sufficient conditions for the attainment of an optimum will not be 
fulfilled, choices that increase the extent to which the other members of 
that set of sufficient conditions for the attainment of that optimum are 
fulfilled cannot be assumed to even tend to bring one closer to the 
optimum. Here is the non-economic example. Assume that there is an 
ideal way to drive a car around a corner (I will not specify the associated 
maximand or objective function [whatever it is that would ideally be 
maximized])—viz., to drive the car 15 miles per hour and turn the 
steering wheel in the appropriate direction 40 degrees per second. If the 
car is being driven 15 miles per hour, the optimal rate at which to turn 
the steering wheel will be 40 degrees per second because, if one turns 
the steering wheel 40 degrees per second in the appropriate direction, 
both (all) of the optimal conditions will be fulfilled, and the optimum 
will be achieved. However, what if the accelerator is jammed, the car is 
moving 85 miles per hour, and nothing can be done about those facts? 
Will it be (second-best) optimal to turn the steering wheel 40 degrees per 
second in the appropriate direction? Almost certainly not. Although it 
might turn out that fulfilling the second optimal condition (turning the 
steering wheel 40 degrees per second in the appropriate direction) is 
second-best optimal, any such reality will be fortuitous in the sense that 
it will not follow from the fact that turning the steering wheel 40 degrees 
per second in the appropriate direction is an optimal condition (belongs 
to a set of sufficient conditions for the achievement of the relevant 
optimum). To determine the best way to turn the steering wheel when 
the car is traveling 85 miles per hour, one would have to examine how 
departures from the two optimal conditions interact to cause suboptimal 
outcomes both in general and in the particular relevant context. For 
example, the presence of a steel-reinforced concrete wall 50 yards from 
the road may play an important role in the relevant analysis even if it 
4
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would play no role in determining the optimal way to drive the car 
around the corner in question. 
The pertinent points of this example are: (1) once one of two 
optimal conditions is not fulfilled, there is no general reason to believe 
that fulfilling or more closely approximating the second optimal 
condition will even tend to improve the outcome and (2) in order to 
determine whether to fulfill or more closely approximate the second of 
two optimal conditions when the first is not fulfilled (or, more generally, 
what to do about a second of two outcome-determinants when the 
magnitude of the first outcome-determinant is not first-best), one must 
combine an appropriate theoretical analysis with context-specific 
empirical findings. 
Even at this juncture, it may be helpful to be more specific about 
the negative corollaries of The General Theory of Second Best. The 
General Theory of Second Best has the following seven economic-
efficiency-related negative corollaries: 
1. the fact that “no imperfections in seller competition” is one of the
set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient 
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not 
justify the conclusion that any choice that reduces the number or 
magnitude of the imperfections in seller competition in an economy 
that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice will tend to increase 
economic efficiency on that account; 
2. the fact that “no imperfections in buyer competition” is one of the
set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient 
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not 
justify the conclusion that any choice that reduces the number or 
magnitude of the imperfections in buyer competition in an economy 
that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice will tend to increase 
economic efficiency on that account; 
3. the fact that “no (real) externalities” is one of the set of Pareto-
optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for 
the maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the 
conclusion that a choice that reduces the number or magnitude of 
externalities in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-
choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account; 
4. the fact that “no taxes on the margin of income” (i.e., no taxes that
increase [directly or indirectly] with income) is one of a set of Pareto-
optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for 
the maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the 
conclusion that a choice that reduces the number or magnitude of taxes 
5
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on the margin of income in an economy that will still be Pareto-
imperfect post-choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that 
account; 
5. the fact that “all resource allocators are sovereign” (i.e., know
everything they need to know to identify the choices that would best 
satisfy their preferences) is one of the set of Pareto-optimal 
conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for the 
maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the conclusion 
that choices that will improve the relevant information that resource 
allocators have in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-
choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account; 
6. the fact that “each resource allocator would always make the
resource-allocating choices that would maximize the extent to which 
his or her preferences are satisfied if each had all relevant information 
[that each resource allocator always maximizes])” is one of the set of 
Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient 
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not 
justify the conclusion that choices that reduce the extent to which 
resource allocators fail to maximize (given the information that is 
available to them) in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect 
post-choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account; 
and 
7. the fact that “no resource-allocating choice yields a critical amount
of buyer surplus (an amount that critically affects the choice that is 
made)” is one of the set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which 
constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for the maximization of 
economic inefficiency—does not justify the conclusion that choices 
that reduce the frequency or the extent to which buyer surplus is 
critical in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice 
will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account. 
The economic example focuses on the conventional claim (which is 
alleged to supply an economic-efficiency rationale for pro-competition 
policies) that any imperfection that decreases the price competition a 
seller faces will cause the seller to increase economic inefficiency by 
choosing not to produce one or more units of the relevant product 
despite the fact that the production of these units would be economically 
efficient (and, relatedly, that any policy that increases the price 
competition a seller faces will cause the seller to decrease economic 
inefficiency by inducing the seller to increase its unit output of the good 
in question). Although the economists who make this claim do not 
specify even the category of use from which the resources used by the 
6
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seller that faces imperfect price competition withdraws the resources it 
uses to produce units of its product, I will assume (as I think they are 
assuming implicitly) that the resources in question were or would be 
withdrawn from alternative unit-output-increasing uses (from the 
production of units of other products). Those who claim that any 
imperfections in price competition an individual seller faces will cause it 
to produce too few units of its product from the perspective of economic 
efficiency assume perfectly plausibly that any seller that faces 
imperfections in price competition (1) will face a downward-sloping 
demand curve—i.e., will be operating in a situation in which the 
successive units it could produce of its product will have progressively-
lower dollar values to the successive, usually-different buyers who place 
the highest dollar-value on the successive units in question—and (2) will 
not find it profitable to engage in price discrimination—indeed, will find 
that the most-profitable or least-unprofitable way to price any quantity of 
its product will be to set the single per-unit price for that product that 
will result in the relevant quantities being purchased and charge that per-
unit price for all units of its product. Ad arguendo, I will accept both of 
these assumptions (though each will be inaccurate in some cases). 
Proponents of these claims then point out that (on the above two 
assumptions) the additional (marginal) revenue that a seller that faces 
imperfections in price competition would obtain by selling the first (say 
[n + 1]th) unit of its product it finds just unprofitable to sell (the first 
extra-marginal unit of its product) will be lower than the price for which 
it could sell that unit since in order to sell the (n + 1)th unit at the 
highest price for which it could be sold, the seller would have to take a 
lower price on the n units of its product it could have sold for a higher 
price. Proponents of these claims then (1) assert that the highest price for 
which any unit of any product could be sold equals the allocative value 
of that unit (the net dollar gain to all affected parties generated by its 
being consumed by its buyer as opposed to its being destroyed in some 
allocatively-costless way) and (2) point out that (on the two additional 
assumptions previously delineated) the preceding assertion implies that 
the private benefits that any producer that faces an imperfection in price 
competition would obtain by producing the first unit of its product it 
finds unprofitable to produce will be lower than the allocative benefits 
that the consumption of that unit (once it was produced) would generate. 
Although the assumption delineated after (1) in the preceding 
sentence will not always be correct in an otherwise-Pareto-imperfect 
economy (in which consumption can generate externalities, buyers can 
misjudge the dollar value of a good to them, buyers can misestimate the 
7
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dollar cost to them of buying a good, buyers may be non-discriminating 
monopsonists, buyers may fail to maximize [given the information they 
possess], and taxes may be levied on the sale of products), ad arguendo I 
will ignore this Second-Best-Theory-relevant reality in the text that 
follows. On the plausible assumption that any seller’s production of the 
first extra-marginal unit of its product would cause the seller to incur an 
infinitesimally-small loss and the dubious4 (implicit) assumption that the 
private additional (marginal) cost the seller would have to incur to 
produce the first unit of its product it would find unprofitable to sell 
would equal the allocative cost of its production of that unit (the 
allocative value that the resources that the production of that unit would 
“use up” would generate in their alternative employments), the 
proponents of these claims then point out that the preceding conclusion 
implies that the decision of any seller that faces an imperfection in price 
competition not to produce the first unit of its product it finds (just) 
unprofitable to produce is economically inefficient. Proponents point out 
that, if the relevant marginal private cost equals the relevant marginal 
allocative cost, the fact that any imperfection in price competition would 
reduce the private benefits to the producer of producing its first extra-
marginal unit of output below the allocative benefits that the 
consumption of that unit of output would generate would imply that the 
choice to produce that first extra-marginal unit of output would be not 
only less profitable than economically efficient but also economically 
inefficient (would sacrifice allocative benefits that would exceed the 
allocative cost it would save) despite the fact that it would be 
infinitesimally profitable (would impose private costs on the producer 
[the marginal revenue it would cause the prospective producer to 
sacrifice] that are just below the private benefits it would confer on the 
producer [the marginal costs it would obviate the producer’s incurring]). 
Proponents of these claims then point out that (on its implicit 
assumptions) the preceding argument establishes not only that producers 
that face imperfect price competition will generate economic 
inefficiency by not producing one or more additional units of their 
respective products but also, and relatedly, that any policies that would 
eliminate the imperfection in price competition the relevant sellers faced 
(without generating any allocative transaction costs or preventing any 
seller from producing its output efficiently—e.g., from taking advantage 
of economies of scale) would increase economic efficiency by 
4. For an explanation of why this assumption is dubious, see the text of this section, starting 
in the next paragraph.  
8
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eliminating the divergence between the marginal revenue (private 
benefits) the seller could obtain by producing the first extra-marginal 
unit of its product and the price for which it could sell that unit (the 
unit’s allocative value) by putting the seller in a position in which it 
could sell the additional unit in question without reducing the price it 
charged for the other units of the product it sold (by confronting the 
seller with a horizontal rather than a downward-sloping demand curve). 
Second-Best Theory implies that, in a world that contains more 
Pareto imperfections than a single imperfection in price competition that 
could be eliminated, the preceding argument would no longer justify the 
conclusions its proponents claim it warrants—the conclusions that any 
seller that faces imperfect price competition will produce an 
economically-inefficiently-low output of its product and the related 
conclusion that any policy that eliminates an imperfection in seller price 
competition will increase economic efficiency by causing the seller that 
originally faced the eliminated imperfection to increase its output to the 
economically-efficient quantity. Second-Best Theory undermines this 
argument because it makes clear that, in an economy that contains other 
imperfections than the individual imperfection in seller price 
competition that can be eliminated, one cannot assume that the marginal 
private cost a seller has to incur to produce successive units of its 
product equals the marginal allocative cost of its doing so. 
I will investigate two hypotheticals that illustrate this point. The 
first assumes that the eliminatable imperfection in seller price 
competition was not the only imperfection in seller price competition in 
the relevant economy. If the seller that faced the eliminatable 
imperfection in price competition would withdraw the resources it would 
use to produce its first extra-marginal unit of output from the production 
of units of other goods by non-discriminating producers that also face 
imperfections in price competition that result in their facing downward-
sloping demand curves, these other imperfections in price competition 
would reduce the marginal cost of the first seller’s output below its 
marginal allocative cost (the allocative value that the resources used to 
produce the relevant unit of output would generate in their alternative 
uses) by reducing the marginal revenue these latter sellers would obtain 
by producing and selling the sacrificed units of output below the 
allocative value of those units of output (the price for which they could 
have been sold, on otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions). This would, 
in turn, reduce the private value to these latter sellers of the resources 
they would have used to produce the sacrificed units of output (a 
function of the marginal revenue the sellers could have obtained by 
9
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selling those sacrificed units of output) below the allocative value those 
resources would have generated in the latter sellers’ employ (a function 
of the higher-than-marginal-revenue price[s] for which the sacrificed 
unit[s] of output could have been sold), thereby reducing the private cost 
of those resources to the first seller (infinitesimally higher than their 
private value to their alternative user) below the allocative cost of the 
first seller’s using those resources (the allocative value the resources 
would have generated in their alternative user’s employ). 
But if the marginal cost of the first unit of output that a seller that 
faces imperfect price competition finds just unprofitable to produce is 
lower than its allocative cost, the fact that the private benefits that that 
seller would have obtained by selling that first additional unit once it 
was produced would be lower than the allocative benefits that would 
have been generated by that unit’s consumption once it was produced 
will not guarantee—indeed, will not even create a higher-than-50% 
probability—that the first seller’s production of the first extra-marginal 
unit of its product would have been economically efficient: when 
marginal cost is lower than marginal allocative cost, the fact that 
marginal revenue is lower than marginal allocative value does not make 
it more likely than not that the profits that would have been generated by 
the production of an extra-marginal unit (marginal revenue minus 
marginal cost) will be lower than the allocative-efficiency gain that 
would have been generated by the production of that unit (marginal 
allocative value minus marginal allocative cost). If the good produced by 
the seller that faces an eliminatable imperfection in seller price 
competition is product X and the goods from whose production resources 
are withdrawn to produce product X are goods Y1. . .YN, X will be 
underproduced relative to Y1. . .YN from the perspective of economic 
efficiency in an economy in which the only Pareto imperfections are 
imperfections in seller price competition if and only if PX/MCX exceeds 
the weighted-average PY/MCY ratio for goods Y1. . .YN where the weights 
assigned to products Y1. . .YN are proportional to the allocative value of 
the sacrificed units of Y1. . .YN respectively. Therefore, in an otherwise-
Pareto-perfect economy in which two or more producers face imperfect 
price competition, one cannot justify the related conclusions that (1) 
sellers that face imperfections in seller price competition will produce 
economically-inefficiently-low outputs and (2) policies that eliminate 
the imperfection in price competition a seller faces will increase 
economic efficiency by citing the fact that no imperfections in seller 
price competition is a Pareto-optimal condition. 
The same conclusions will be justified when the economy contains 
10
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any other type of Pareto imperfection. Assume, for example, that the 
producer of X that faced an imperfection in seller price competition used 
a production process to produce X that generated external costs. Since 
the non-internalization of these external costs will cause the marginal 
private cost of X to its producer to be lower than the marginal allocative 
cost of X, the same argument I used to justify the conclusion that, in the 
absence of further information, one cannot assume that the elimination 
of an imperfection in seller price competition will increase economic 
efficiency by inducing the seller in question to increase its unit output 
when the economy in question contains other imperfections in seller 
price competition also justifies the conclusion that, in the absence of 
further information, one cannot assume that the elimination of even the 
only imperfection in seller price competition in an economy will 
increase economic efficiency in the above way if the economy also 
contains an external cost of production. 
This Part has focused on the negative implications of The General 
Theory of Second Best. I hasten to point out one should not exaggerate 
the significance of these negative implications. The General Theory of 
Second Best does not imply either that it will never be economically 
efficient to eliminate or reduce a Pareto imperfection or that it will never 
be possible or economically efficient for an economic-efficiency analyst 
to predict that a choice that would reduce or eliminate (or, for that matter 
increase) a Pareto imperfection would increase economic efficiency on 
that account. However, The General Theory of Second Best does imply 
that, to justify any such conclusion, an analyst must make a sound 
argument that is theoretically sophisticated about the different ways in 
which the various Pareto imperfections in the system (which could 
individually cause economic inefficiency in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect 
economy) interact to cause different categories of economic inefficiency 
and incorporates the results of ex ante economically-efficient research 
into the magnitudes of the parameters whose salience the theory 
establishes. 
III. THE ECONOMICALLY-EFFICIENT PROTOCOL FOR PREDICTING OR
POSTDICTING THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A CHOICE 
Three general categories of approaches to economic-efficiency 
analysis can be distinguished: 
1. first-best-allocative-efficiency analysis—the category of analysis
that most economists use—proceeds on the assumption that the Pareto 
imperfection that the choice under review targets or is assumed to be 
11
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affecting is the only (relevant) Pareto imperfection in the economy; 
2. second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis executes perfect
theoretical analyses of the causes of all the categories of economic 
inefficiency whose magnitudes the choice under review did or would 
affect and the diverse ways in which those causes interact to cause 
each such category of resource misallocation, collects perfectly 
accurate data on the pre-choice and post-choice magnitudes of the 
parameters that determine the amount of each category of resource 
misallocation the economy in question contains or contained pre-
choice and contained or would contain post-choice, and analyzes 
perfectly the implications of the preceding research for the impact that 
the choice had/would have on each category of economic inefficiency 
whose magnitudes it did/would affect; and 
3. third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis takes account not only of
the possible allocative benefits that all relevant theoretical-research and 
empirical-research projects would generate but also of the allocative 
cost of each such project (the allocative cost of the resources that 
relevant research-projects would consume, any allocative cost they 
would generate by delaying a related government decision, and any 
allocative cost the project would generate by requiring the government 
to make intrinsically-economically-inefficient choices to finance its 
execution) and executes only those projects that are deemed to be ex 
ante allocatively efficient. 
I use the acronym FBLE to reference “first-best-allocative-efficiency” or 
“first-best allocatively efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its 
resemblance to the word “fable” since FBLE analyses are based on the 
fable that the target Pareto imperfection is the only [relevant] Pareto 
imperfection in the system)5; I use the acronym SBLE to reference 
“second-best-allocative-efficiency” or “second-best allocatively 
efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its resemblance to the 
word “sable” since SBLE analyses would be not only beautiful but 
prohibitively expensive [if they could be executed]); and I use the 
acronym TBLE to reference “third-best-allocative-efficiency” or “third-
best allocatively efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its 
resemblance to the word “table” since TBLE analysis is the type of 
analysis that should be brought to the policy-evaluation table). 
This Part of the Article will briefly, and therefore crudely, outline 
the protocol for an economic-efficiency analysis that I think is TBLE. I 
5. My daughter, Stefanie, has suggested that the acronym FBLE is also appropriate because 
first-best-allocative-efficiency analyses are “feeble.” 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/9
2016] THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST AND ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY 449 
will start by defining eleven concepts or sets of concepts that this 
protocol references. 
The first relevant concept is the concept of a category of “resource-
use.” I distinguish the following five basic categories of resource-uses: 
(1) unit-output-increasing resource-uses, in which resources are used to 
increase the output of an existing product (the symbol UO is used to 
refer both to “unit-output-increasing uses” and to “unit output”); (2) 
quality-or-variety-increasing-investment-creating resource-uses, in 
which resources are devoted to creating a superior or additional product-
variant, a superior or additional distributive outlet, or additional 
inventory or capacity (which increase the average speed with which the 
owner of the created inventory or capacity can supply buyers throughout 
a fluctuating-demand cycle) (the symbol QV will be used to refer both to 
“quality-or-variety-increasing” and to “QV-investment-creating uses”); 
(3) production-process-research-executing resource-uses, in which 
resources are devoted to discovering alternative production processes 
whose use would reduce the average total private and/or allocative cost 
of producing a relevant quantity of an existing product (the symbol PPR 
is used to refer both to “production-process research” and to “PPR-
executing uses”); (4) uses of resources that result from the choice among 
known production processes that could be employed to produce a 
relevant quantity of an existing product, including non-innovative, cost-
reducing, investment-creating resource-uses (using known technology to 
construct new plants, to modernize old plants, or to select and train a 
workforce to reduce average costs of production); and (5) consumption 
resource-uses (in which final goods are consumed by final consumers). 
The second relevant concept is the concept of a (somewhat) 
arbitrarily-defined portion of product-space, which I reference with the 
acronym ARDEPPS. I substitute this concept for the conventional 
concept of a “market” because I believe that there is no non-arbitrary 
way to define either classical economic markets (which are supposed to 
be defined to maximize the fulfillment of certain ideal-type assumptions 
about [1] the competitiveness of products placed within a market and [2] 
the difference between the competitiveness of any pair of products 
placed in a given market and the competitiveness of any product in that 
market with any product not in that market) or antitrust markets (which 
are supposed to be defined to maximize the contribution that data on 
market-aggregated parameters can make to the legally-correct resolution 
of antitrust cases).6 
6. For a fuller discussion of the inevitable arbitrariness of market definitions, see RICHARD 
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The third relevant concept is the concept of a category of “actual 
allocation of resources.” In my (standard) terminology, the expression 
“resource allocation” refers to the withdrawal of resources from one or 
more categories of use in one or more specified ARDEPPSes and their 
devotion to a specified use in a specified ARDEPPS. Thus, an actual 
resource allocation might involve the creation of a new product-variant 
(in my terminology, the creation of a QV investment) with some 
resources withdrawn from UO-increasing uses, some resources 
withdrawn from alternative QV-investment-creating uses, and some 
resources withdrawn from PPR-executing uses. 
The fourth relevant concept is the concept of a resource-allocation 
component. Although I acknowledge that most actual resource 
allocations involve the withdrawal of resources from two or more 
categories of resource-uses and their devotion to one category of 
resource-use, for expositional and computational reasons, the distortion-
analysis protocol distinguishes and focuses on the following 6 categories 
of one-category-of-resource-use to one-category-of-resource-use actual-
resource-allocation components: (1) UO-to-UO allocations, (2) QV-to-
QV allocations, (3) PPR-to-PPR allocations, (4) UO-to-QV or QV-to-
UO allocations, (5) PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR allocations, and (6) UO-
to-PPR or PPR-to-UO allocations. 
The fifth relevant concept is the concept of a category of resource 
misallocation. I distinguish 10 basic categories of resource misallocation 
(economic inefficiency). 
1. misallocations of resources between or among alternative unit-
output-increasing uses between the production of alternative final 
products or inputs (inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocations between 
the production of final products or inputs [when the products or inputs 
in question are distant competitors] and intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO 
misallocations between the production of final products or inputs 
[when the products or inputs in question are close competitors] and [as 
I have already indicated] the term “ARDEPPS” is an acronym for a 
[somewhat] arbitrarily-defined portion of product-space); 
2. misallocations of resources between or among alternative QV-
investment-creating uses (inter-ARDEPPS and intra-ARDEPPS QV-
to-QV misallocations); 
S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. 
ANTITRUST LAW: VOLUME I BASIC CONCEPTS AND ECONOMICS-BASED LEGAL ANALYSES OF 
OLIGOPOLISTIC AND PREDATORY CONDUCT 165-81 (Springer, 2014) and Richard S. Markovits, On 
the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 572-74, 581, 586, 
600-01 (2002).  
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3. misallocations of resources between or among alternative PPR-
executing uses (inter-ARDEPPS and intra-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR 
misallocations); 
4. misallocations of resources between unit-output-increasing and QV-
investment-creating uses (UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocations); 
5. misallocations of resources between PPR-executing and QV-
investment-creating uses (PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR misallocations); 
6. misallocations of resources between PPR-executing and UO-
increasing uses (PPR-to-UO or UO-to-PPR misallocations); 
7. misallocations of resources between known, alternative production
processes (non-research-related “production optimum” 
misallocations); 
8. misallocations of resources that result when a buyer purchases an
input or final good from a supplier that is not allocatively-best-placed 
to supply the buyer—i.e., from a supplier that generated higher 
marginal or incremental allocative costs to supply the buyer than an 
alternative supplier of the same input or final good would have had to 
generate to do so; 
9. misallocations of final goods among their potential final consumers
that do not derive from any associated poverty and income/wealth 
inequality (conventional “consumption optimum” misallocations); and 
10. misallocations of final goods among their potential final consumers
that is generated by the poverty and/or income/wealth inequality that 
results from the actual allocation of final goods among their potential 
final consumers (non-conventional “consumption optimum” 
misallocation). 
The sixth set of relevant concepts contains three categories of 
avoidable costs that choices can affect. The impact of a choice on these 
allocative costs is relevant to its economic efficiency—indeed, affects its 
allocative efficiency dollar for dollar: (1) the (non-public-finance-
related) allocative transaction costs generated in the relevant economy 
by both its government and its non-government actors, (2) the risk (and 
uncertainty) costs that relevant actors incur and the allocative costs that 
actors generate to reduce the risk costs they bear, and (3) the public-
finance-related, economic-efficiency losses the government generates 
when financing its operations. 
The seventh relevant concept is the concept of “the economics-
marginal resource allocation in a specified category in a specified 
ARDEPPS”—the least-profitable but not-unprofitable resource 
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allocation in that category in that ARDEPPS. 
The eighth relevant concept is the concept of a “mathematics-
marginal resource allocation”—a resource allocation that is 
infinitesimally small. Economics-marginal resource allocations may or 
may not be mathematics-marginal. 
The ninth relevant concept is the concept of “the distortion in any 
private-benefit, private-cost, or profit figure”—the difference between 
the private figure in question and its allocative counterpart (respectively, 
the allocative benefit, allocative cost, or economic efficiency of a 
specified resource-allocating choice). 
The tenth relevant concept is the concept of the aggregate 
percentage-distortion in the profits yielded by a specified economics-
marginal resource allocation in a specified ARDEPPS—(the profits 
yielded by that allocation minus the impact of that allocation on 
economic efficiency) divided by the allocative cost of that allocation. 
The eleventh and final concept I want to explain at this juncture is 
the resource-allocation marginal-allocative-product curve for a specified 
resource-allocation component in a specified ARDEPPS. This curve 
appears in a diagram whose vertical axis measures dollars (in practice, 
measures in dollars the allocative product and allocative cost of the 
successive resource allocations in the specified category in the specified 
ARDEPPS) and whose horizontal axis measures the total allocative cost 
of resources devoted to the specified resource allocation in the specified 
ARDEPPS. The curve indicates the allocative value that would be 
generated by successive uses of resource measured by their allocative 
cost when devoted to the category of use specified in the ARDEPPS 
specified after having been withdrawn from the specified categories of 
use in specified ARDEPPSes. 
The protocol that I think will prove to be the third-best-allocatively-
efficient approach to predicting or postdicting the impact of any choice 
on economic efficiency has three distinguishing features. First, it uses 
different approaches to analyze the impacts of a choice respectively on 
(1) inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO, inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV, inter-
ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO, QV-to-PPR or PPR-
to-QV, and UO-to-PPR or PPR-to-UO misallocation; (2) intra-
ARDEPPS UO-to-UO, intra-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV, intra-ARDEPPS 
PPR-to-PPR misallocation, the misallocation that results when 
homogeneous final goods or inputs are supplied by higher-allocative-
cost rather than lower-allocative-cost suppliers, the misallocation that 
results when for other reasons producers choose to use a known, higher-
allocative-cost rather than a known, lower-allocative-cost production 
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process, consumption-optimum misallocation that is not generated by 
the income/wealth inequality in the economy in question, and 
consumption-optimum misallocation that is generated by income/wealth 
inequality; and (3) the choice’s impacts on the allocative transaction 
costs generated in the economy in question, the risk and uncertainty 
costs that individual members of the relevant society bear and the 
allocative costs they generate to reduce the risk and uncertainty costs 
they bear, and the amount of economic inefficiency the government 
generates when financing its operations. 
Second, the approach that I think will prove to be TBLE to take to 
predicting or postdicting the impact of a choice on the six categories of 
economic inefficiency listed after (1) in the preceding sentence focuses 
on the choice’s predicted impacts on the aggregate percentage-
distortions in the profits yielded by the economics-marginal exemplars 
of the categories of resource allocation associated with each of these 
categories of economic inefficiency in a TBLE-large, random sample of 
the economy’s ARDEPPSes and on the attributes of the studied 
ARDEPPSes’ relevant resource-allocation, marginal-allocative-product 
curves between the pre-choice and post-choice total-allocative-cost 
quantities for the categories of resource allocation in question in the 
studied ARDEPPSes. The protocol I am recommending focuses on the 
impacts of choices on the distortions in the profit-figures for these 
economics-marginal resource allocations because, as we saw in the first 
section of this Article, (1) negative distortions in such profit-figures will 
usually imply that, from the perspective of economic efficiency, too few 
resources have been devoted to the relevant category of resource 
allocation in the ARDEPPSes in question (that one or more resource 
allocations in the relevant category were not made in the ARDEPPSes in 
question because they would have been unprofitable despite the fact that 
they would have been economically efficient) and (2) positive 
distortions in such profit-figures will usually imply that, from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, too many resources have been 
devoted to the relevant category of resource allocation in the 
ARDEPPSes in question (that some resource allocations in the relevant 
category were made in the ARDEPPSes in question because they were 
profitable despite the fact that they were economically inefficient). 
Third, the approach that I think will prove to be TBLE to take to 
analyzing the economic efficiency of a choice takes account of the fact 
that theoretical work and empirical work are usually non-perfect and 
always allocatively costly by instructing the economic-efficiency analyst 
to proceed by (1) generating initial assessments of the economic 
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efficiency of the choice under review from a less-than-perfect research 
base, then (2) analyzing the ex ante allocative efficiency of doing 
additional research on specific issues and doing the research deemed to 
be ex ante economically efficient, (3) continuing this process until no 
additional research is concluded to be ex ante economically efficient, 
and (4) announcing the conclusion that the research done warrants in a 
paper that describes in detail the protocol that was followed and the 
intermediate conclusions that were generated. I recognize that this 
account does not address the infinite-regress problem that attaches to any 
such maximizing analysis: a problem posed by the question whether an 
analyst who is trying to maximize the economic efficiency of his or her 
efforts should make an economically-efficient attempt to consider 
whether he or she should think about whether to think about whether to 
think about whether to think about whether to think about . . . the 
economic efficiency of doing addition research of a specific kind on a 
specific issue. 
The protocol for the economic-efficiency analysis I think would be 
TBLE contains the following 29 steps (take heart—that is still 30 steps 
fewer than the movie): 
1. define inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO, inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV,
inter-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO, PPR-to-QV or 
QV-to-PPR, and UO-to-PPR or PPR-to-UO resource misallocation; 
2. analyze the way in which a relevant exemplar of each type of Pareto
imperfection would tend to cause each of the six categories of 
economic inefficiency defined in Step (1) in an otherwise-Pareto-
perfect economy by distorting the profits generated by the economics-
marginal resource allocations with which each of these categories of 
resource misallocation is associated and/or by causing a relevant 
resource allocator to make a privately-unprofitable resource-allocating 
choice of the relevant kind; 
3. divide up the economy’s product-space into the set of ARDEPPSes
that are economically efficient to distinguish and choose a random, 
third-best-economically-efficiently-large sample of those ARDEPPSes 
on which to focus the analysis of the impact of the choice on the 
categories of economic inefficiency defined in Step (1); 
4. analyze the different ways in which all exemplars of all types of
Pareto imperfections interact to distort the profitability of the 
economics-marginal resource allocations associated respectively with 
each of the six Step-(1)-defined categories of economic inefficiency—
inter alia, create mathematical formulas that indicate the different 
ways in which the various Pareto imperfections interact to generate 
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distortions in the profits yielded by the economics-marginal exemplars 
in any defined ARDEPPS of the various categories of resource 
allocation with which each of these six categories of resource 
misallocation is associated; 
5. assuming that the relevant resource-allocating decisions maximize
the profits of the relevant resource-allocating principals, analyze the 
relationship between (A) the amount of misallocation in any of the six 
categories defined in Step (1) that a given ARDEPPS contains and 
(B)(i) the aggregate distortion in the profits yielded by the economics-
marginal exemplars of the associated category of resource allocations 
and (ii) the attributes of the relevant ARDEPPS’ resource-allocation 
marginal-allocative-product curve (MLP. . ./. . .) between the quantity of 
resources measured by their allocative cost that would be allocatively 
efficient to devote to the relevant category of resource allocation in the 
relevant ARDEPPS and the quantity of resources actually devoted to 
that category of resource allocation in the ARDEPPS in question; 
6. analyze the relationship between the errors that resource allocators
in any ARDEPPS commit by choosing to effectuate unprofitable extra-
marginal resource allocations in any Step-(1)-defined category and by 
choosing not to effectuate profitable economics-marginal and 
economics-intra-marginal resource allocations in any Step-(1)-defined 
category and the amount of resource misallocation in the relevant 
category the ARDEPPS in question contains, given the aggregate 
distortion in the profits that would have been yielded by its economics-
marginal resource allocation in the relevant category and the attributes 
of its MLP. . ./. . . curve over the relevant range of relevant-resource-
allocation quantities; 
7. combine (A) existing data on and parameter-guesstimates of the
number and/or magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in the relevant 
economy pre-choice that affect the aggregate distortions in the profits 
yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocations in the Step-
(1)-defined categories in the ARDEPPSes to be studied and (B) the 
mathematical formulas developed in Step (4) to generate 
estimates/guesstimates of the pre-choice aggregate distortions in the 
profits yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocations in the 
six categories defined in Step (1) in the ARDEPPSes studied; 
8. estimate or guesstimate (A) the impacts of the choice on the
magnitudes of the Pareto imperfections and other factors that 
determine the aggregate distortion in the profits yielded by the 
economics-marginal resource allocations in the Step-(1)-defined 
categories in the ARDEPPSes to be studied and derivatively (B) the 
impact of the choice on the aggregate distortions in the profits yielded 
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by (the usually-changing) economics-marginal resource allocations in 
each Step-(1)-defined category in each ARDEPPS to be studied; 
9. estimate or guesstimate the attributes of the pre-choice MLP. . ./. . .
curves for each Step-(1)-defined category of resource allocation in 
each ARDEPPS to be studied over the range of total allocative cost 
figures associated with the pre-choice and post-choice aggregate-
profit-distortion estimates; 
10. on the assumption (that will be relaxed below) that the choice
under consideration will not alter the attributes of any relevant 
MLP. . ./. . . curve over any relevant range by increasing the 
organizational allocative efficiency (proficiency) of the firms that 
execute the UO-increasing, QV-creating, or PPR-executing resource-
uses whose allocative products such curves indicate, derive an estimate 
or guesstimate of the impact of the choice on the amounts of each 
Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation that the studied 
ARDEPPSes contain from Step (7)’s estimates or guesstimates of the 
pre-choice magnitudes of the aggregate distortions in the profits 
yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocation in each Step-
(1)-defined category in each studied ARDEPPS, Step (8)’s estimates or 
guesstimates of the impact of the choice on those aggregate-profit-
distortion figures, and Step (9)’s estimates or guesstimates of the 
attributes of the pre-choice MLP. . ./. . . curves over the relevant ranges; 
11. devote a TBLE amount of resources to considering the possibility
that the choice whose economic efficiency is at issue may have altered 
the attributes of one or more relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves in some way 
other than by increasing the organizational allocative proficiency of the 
firms that execute the relevant resource-uses (e.g., by changing the 
distribution of income/wealth in the relevant society) and, if (contrary 
to my suspicions) it proves to be TBLE to consider this possibility to 
any significant extent, estimate or guesstimate the impacts that the 
choice has on relevant segments of relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves and the 
impacts the choice has on the amount of Step-(1)-listed categories of 
resource misallocation the studied ARDEPPSes contain on this 
account—i.e., generate new estimates of the choice’s impact on the 
amounts of each Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation 
the studied ARDEPPSes contain that take account of the choice’s 
impacts on the studied ARDEPPSes’ relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves; 
12. estimate or guesstimate the total amount of resources measured by
their allocative cost that the economy devoted to each Step-(1)-defined 
category of resource allocation pre-choice; 
13. estimate or guesstimate the total amount of resources measured by
their allocative cost the studied ARDEPPSes devoted to each Step-(1)-
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defined category of resource allocation pre-choice; 
14. on the assumption that the choice would not affect either the
organizational allocative proficiency of any relevant resource-user or 
the totals calculated in Steps (12) and (13), estimate or guesstimate the 
impact of the choice on the total amount of each Step-(1)-defined 
category of resource misallocation the relevant economy contains by 
multiplying the studied-ARDEPPS estimates/guesstimates of Step (11) 
by the ratio of the relevant economy-wide total-allocative-cost figure 
estimated in Step (12) to the studied-ARDEPPS total-allocative-cost 
figure estimated in Step (13); 
15. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice would have on
the total amount of Step-(1)-defined categories of resource 
misallocation that the economy would contain if the choice would not 
affect the organizational allocative efficiency of any relevant resource-
user or the total allocative cost of the resource allocations associated 
with any Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation either in 
any studied ARDEPPS or in the economy as a whole by summing the 
six separate estimates or guesstimates generated in Step (14); 
16. devote a TBLE amount of resources to investigating the possible
impact of the choice on the total allocative cost of the resources 
devoted to each category of resource allocation associated with a Step-
(1)-defined category of resource misallocation both in the studied 
ARDEPPSes and in the economy as a whole and, if the conclusion is 
reached that the choice would or did affect the quantities in question, 
revise the estimates/guesstimates of Step (14) and (15) to take these 
impacts into account—i.e., generate new estimates or guesstimates of 
the choice’s impact on the total amount of Step-(1)-defined 
misallocation the economy contains that take the Step-(16)-referenced 
possibility into account; 
17. define intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocation, intra-ARDEPPS
QV-to-QV misallocation, intra-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR misallocation, 
the misallocation generated when buyers of homogeneous inputs or 
final products purchase them from suppliers that are not allocatively-
best-placed to supply them with the inputs or final products in 
question, the misallocation generated when (for other reasons) more-
allocatively-costly, known production processes are used rather than 
less-allocatively-costly, known production processes, and 
consumption-optimum misallocation that is not generated by any 
poverty or income/wealth inequality associated with the allocation of 
final goods among their potential final consumers; 
18. analyze the Pareto imperfections or categories of conduct that
would cause each of the Step-(17)-listed categories of resource 
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misallocation in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy if no choice 
could deter a producer from employing or enable a producer to employ 
a privately-cheaper, known production process that was also 
allocatively cheaper, could deter a potential QV investor from creating 
or enable a potential QV investor to create a more-profitable QV 
investment, or could deter a potential production-process researcher 
from executing or enable a potential production-process researcher to 
execute a more-profitable and more-allocatively efficient PPR project;7 
19. (A) in what I contestably take to be the vast majority of cases—
viz., cases in which only one of the potential causes of any of the 
categories of resource misallocation listed in Step (17) is operative to a 
significant extent, predict or postdict the impact of the choice under 
review on the amount of that type of misallocation the relevant 
economy contains, assuming that it does not have any of the deterring 
or enabling effects referenced in Steps (17) and (18), by using existing 
data to estimate or by guesstimating the pre-choice incidence of the 
operative cause of the category of misallocation in question, devoting 
an ex-ante-allocatively-efficient amount of resources to estimating the 
impact of the choice under review on the incidence of that cause, and 
devoting an ex-ante-allocatively-efficient amount of resources to 
estimating the impact that the choice-generated change in the incidence 
of the relevant cause would have on the amount of the relevant 
category of resource misallocation the economy in question would 
contain if it were otherwise-Pareto-perfect; and (B) in those cases in 
which two or more of the possible causes of one of the Step-(17)-listed 
categories of resource misallocation are present to a significant degree, 
predict or postdict the impact of the choice under review on the 
amount of resource misallocation the relevant economy contains by 
executing an analysis (that I will not fully outline here) that takes 
account of the way in which the different types of Pareto imperfections 
that would cause each of these categories of resource misallocation in 
an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy that are present to a significant 
degree in the relevant economy interact to generate the relevant 
7. For example, (1) explain how even on the above assumptions in an otherwise-Pareto-
perfect economy intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocation and the misallocation generated by the 
supply of homogeneous inputs or final products by allocatively-higher-cost suppliers would be 
generated by predatory pricing, retaliatory pricing, external-cost-of-production differences, or 
relevant buyer errors, (2) explain why fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation will tend 
to cause the regulated firm to use a known, higher-private-cost and presumptively-higher-allocative-
cost production process that is more-capital-intensive rather than a known, less-capital-intensive 
production process that is less-privately-and-presumptively-less-allocatively expensive, and (3) 
explain how in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy consumption-optimum misallocation that is 
not generated by poverty or income/wealth inequality would be caused by price discrimination, 
inter-consumer differences in consumption externalities, and relevant consumer errors. 
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category of resource misallocation by distorting the profitability of the 
relevant resource-allocating choices and by leading the relevant 
resource allocators to make unprofitable resource-allocating choices 
and estimating or guesstimating both the pre-choice incidence of the 
causes of each of these categories of resource misallocation and the 
impacts of the choice under review on the incidence of the causes of 
each such category of resource misallocation; 
20. estimate or guesstimate the impact that a choice (say, a business
choice to execute or not to execute a merger, acquisition, or joint 
venture or to grow internally or a government choice to prohibit/tax or 
allow/subsidize a class of private-business choices to execute mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures or to grow internally) has on the 
organizational allocative efficiency (proficiency) of one or more firms 
by permitting or precluding them from combining assets that are 
complementary for scale or non-scale reasons and/or by enabling two 
or more firms to reduce the extent to which their QV investments 
and/or PPR projects are more duplicative than is jointly profitable and 
economically efficient: (A) when the choice in question would reduce 
the private costs that a relevant firm or firms would have to incur to 
produce its/their pre-choice outputs and/or additional units of a 
particular good it or they are already producing, estimate or 
guesstimate (i) the frequency with which the choice would have this 
effect, (ii) the private-cost savings the choice would enable the firm or 
firms in question to obtain on its/their pre-choice outputs, (iii) the ratio 
of the associated allocative-cost savings to the private-cost savings in 
question,8 (iv) the quantity of additional output the choice would 
induce the firm or firms in question to produce and the economic 
efficiency of its/their producing the extra units in question;9 (B) when 
8. This ratio will depend on the percentages of the saved resources that would otherwise
have been withdrawn from UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses and the ratio of 
the allocative value that the saved resources would have generated in those alternative uses to the 
private benefits they would have generated for their alternative employers. 
9. The impact that the production of the extra units in question will have on economic
efficiency will depend on its impact on the pre-choice and post-choice difference between the ratios 
of each relevant product’s P*/MC* ratio and the weighted-average counterpart ratio(s) for the 
products Z1. . .ZN whose sales would be reduced by the output-expansion for the product in question 
where (1) the asterisks attached to the Ps indicate that the P* figures have been adjusted to make 
each P* figure equal the marginal allocative value (MLV) of the good in question (i.e., to take 
account of the fact that P may not equal MLV in a Pareto-imperfect economy), (2) the asterisks 
attached to the MCs indicate that each MC figure has been adjusted to produce MC* figures whose 
ratio indicates the marginal rate at which the relevant economy can transform the sacrificed bundle 
of Z1. . .ZN products into the marginal unit of X (an adjustment required by the fact that the 
associated MC ratio will equal the relevant marginal rate of transformation only fortuitously in a 
Pareto-imperfect economy), and (3) the weighted –average P*/MC* ratio for Z1. . .ZN is created by 
giving weights to the P*/MC* ratios for the individual products in product-set Z1. . .ZN that are 
proportionate to the allocative values of the sacrificed quantities of the respective products in 
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the choice in question would increase the allocative efficiency of the 
QV investments that a relevant firm or firms could create by increasing 
the intrinsic efficiency of its or their individual QV investments, 
estimate or guesstimate (i) the frequency with which the choice would 
induce the firm or firms in question to substitute one or more 
intrinsically-more-profitable QV investments for the same quantity of 
intrinsically-less-profitable individual QV investments, (ii) the Pareto-
imperfections-generated distortion in the profits yielded by any such 
QV-investment substitution(s), (iii) the frequency with which the 
choice would induce the firm(s) whose organizational economic 
efficiency it increased or one of its/their rivals to make a QV 
investment when no QV investment would otherwise have been made 
by increasing the intrinsic profitability of the additional QV investment 
the figure in question could make and thereby either leading the firm in 
question to make an additional QV investment or inducing a rival to 
make a QV investment by creating a situation in which the firm would 
invest if the rival did not, (iv) the profits yielded by any such induced 
QV investment and the distortion in those profits (the economic 
efficiency of any additional QV investments the choice induced to be 
made),10 (v) the frequency with which the choice would deter the firm 
or firms in question or one of its/their rivals from making a QV 
investment by creating a situation in which the firm or firms and the 
rival realize that if one of them makes a QV investment the other will 
find it profitable to respond by making a QV investment as well, and 
(vi) the amount by which the QV investment that was deterred would 
have increased or decreased economic efficiency;11 (C) when the 
choice in question would enable two or more firms that were separate 
at least pre-choice to reduce the extent to which their QV investments 
were jointly-unprofitably-duplicative and (presumptively) economic-
inefficiently-duplicative, estimate or guesstimate (i) the profits the 
choice would enable the firms in question to realize by substituting 
less-duplicative for more-duplicative QV investments (controlling for 
the quantity of resources they devote to QV investment), (ii) the 
Pareto-imperfection-generated distortion in those profits, (iii) whether 
and the extent to which, by increasing their ability to make less-
duplicative QV investments, the choice makes it profitable for the 
firms in question to make additional QV investments, (iv) the profits 
product-set Z1. . .ZN. 
10. The sum of the impacts of those investments on inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV
misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR 
misallocation. 
11. The sum of the impacts of the elimination of the QV investment in question on inter-
ARDEPPS QV-to-QV misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or 
QV-to-PPR misallocation.  
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the firms in question realize on any additional QV investments the 
choice induces them to make and the Pareto-imperfection-generated 
distortion in those profits (the economic efficiency of any induced 
additional QV investments12), (v) whether and the extent to which, by 
increasing their ability to make less-duplicative QV investments, the 
choice makes it profitable for the firms in question to reduce the 
amount of QV investments they make in the relevant area of product-
space, and (vi) the profits the firms in question realize by reducing the 
amount of QV investments they make in the relevant area of product-
space and the Pareto-imperfection-generated distortion in those profits 
(the effect of the QV-investment reduction on economic efficiency);13 
(D) when the choice in question would increase the allocative 
efficiency of the PPR that a relevant firm or firms could execute by 
increasing the intrinsic allocative efficiency of the individual PPR 
projects it/they execute, estimate or guesstimate the parameters, sets of 
parameters, and economic-efficiency effects that are counterparts to 
the six listed after “20(B)” for the counterpart QV-investment-related 
possibility, and (E) when the choice in question would increase the 
allocative efficiency of the set of PPR projects one or more firms 
execute with a given amount of resources measured by their allocative 
cost by reducing the extent to which the PPR projects it or they execute 
are jointly-unprofitably-duplicative and presumptively economic-
inefficiently-duplicative and when the choice in question either 
induces one or more firms to execute additional PPR projects or deters 
it or them from allocating as many resources to PPR as it or they 
would otherwise have done, estimate or guesstimate the parameters, 
sets of parameters, and economic-efficiency effects that are 
counterparts to those listed after “20(C)” for the QV-investment-
related counterpart analysis; 
21. estimate or guesstimate the impact of the choice under review on
the amount of consumption-optimum misallocation the relevant 
economy contains because of the poverty and income/wealth 
inequality associated with its allocation of final goods among their 
potential final consumers by estimating or guesstimating (A) the 
poverty and income/wealth inequality present in the relevant economy 
pre-choice, (B) the impact of the choice on the extent of poverty and 
income/wealth inequality on the society in question, and (C) the extent 
to which the choice-generated changes in poverty and income/wealth 
12. The sum of the impacts of the induced QV investments on inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV 
misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR 
misallocation.  
13. The sum of the impacts that the eliminated QV investment originally had on inter-
ARDEPPS QV-to-QV misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or 
QV-to-PPR misallocation.  
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inequality will affect the magnitudes of the seven categories of 
poverty-and/or-income/wealth-inequality-generated misallocation that 
will be identified in the final paragraph of Part IV of this Article (the 
paragraph that immediately precedes its Conclusion); 
22. estimate or guesstimate the economic-efficiency effect of the
impact that the choice under review will have by generating fiscal 
effects that cause the government to make decisions that alter 
economic efficiency: (A) estimate or guesstimate the fiscal impact of 
the choice under review (its impact on the tax revenues the relevant 
government collects, the profits the relevant government makes by 
selling goods and services conventionally produced by non-
government actors, the fees it collects for providing what are 
conventionally government-services [e.g., court fees], the private 
transaction costs it incurs to devise and pass legislative and 
administrative regulations and to implement such laws and regulations 
through the Executive Branch [through administrative agencies, police, 
prosecutorial offices, prison systems, and parole-related institutions], 
and the private transaction costs the government incurs to operate its 
courts); and (B) estimate or guesstimate the economic efficiency of the 
decisions that the choice under review causes the relevant government 
to make by altering its fiscal position—(i) if the analyst concludes that 
the choice under review will worsen the government’s fiscal position, 
(a) estimate or guesstimate the extents to which the government will 
respond to this reality by raising tax-rates or imposing new taxes, by 
raising the prices it charges for goods and services, by printing money 
or selling bonds to “finance” the relevant deficit, or by eliminating 
other expenditures and (b) analyze the economic-efficiency effects of 
these government responses, and (ii) if the analyst concludes that the 
choice under review will improve the government’s fiscal position, (a) 
estimate or guesstimate the extents to which the government will 
respond to this reality by lowering tax-rates or eliminating some taxes, 
lowering the prices it charges for goods and services, destroying some 
of the money it possesses or retiring some government debt, or making 
other expenditures and (b) analyzing the economic efficiency of each 
of these responses; 
23. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice will have on the
allocative transaction costs generated in the economy that were not 
counted as an allocative cost in the previously-executed economic-
efficiency predictions or postdictions: (A) the additional allocative 
transaction costs that a government choice to devise and pass a policy 
caused or would cause the government to generate itself and the 
additional allocative transaction costs that a government choice to 
implement a policy (say, enforce a law or process a transfer-claim) 
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caused or would cause the government to generate, the perpetrators to 
generate (to defend themselves if they were being prosecuted or 
subjected to an administrative hearing or to conceal their illegal 
activity or to pursue a transfer-claim), victims to generate to obtain 
redress or compensation, and those who think they are or may be 
eligible for government transfers to generate to apply for those 
transfers or (B) the allocative-transaction-cost reductions that a 
government choice to pass or implement a law or regulation would 
generate by deterring potential violators from engaging in allocative-
transaction-costly conduct and by obviating the potential victims of the 
deterred conduct making allocative-transaction-costly moves to reduce 
their vulnerability to such conduct. 
24. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice under review
had or would have on the risk and uncertainty costs that relevant 
individuals bear (which are allocative as well as private costs) and on 
the allocative cost of the risk-and-uncertainty-cost-reduction moves 
that individuals and organizations make; 
25. add together the estimates and/or guesstimates of the impacts of the
choice under review on the amounts of all categories of resource 
misallocation, on the amount of misallocation the government’s related 
fiscal decisions generate, on those of the allocative transaction costs 
generated in the economy that were not previously counted, on the risk 
and uncertainty costs borne by relevant individuals, and on the 
allocative cost of the risk-and-uncertainty-cost-avoidance moves made 
by relevant individuals and organizations to generate an initial estimate 
of the economic efficiency of the choice under review; 
26. assess the ex ante economic efficiency of doing further theoretical
research and additional empirical research into the magnitudes of the 
parameters whose relevance to the economic efficiency of the choice 
under review theory has established: estimate (A) the allocative cost of 
withdrawing from their alternative uses the resources that would be 
devoted to the additional research projects that could be executed, any 
allocative cost any additional research would generate by delaying the 
relevant choice/decision, and any net allocative costs the government 
would generate to finance the research expenditures in question; (B) 
the allocative benefits that each possible research-project would 
generate—(i) the probability that the information that each possible 
additional research project would provide would critically affect the 
analyst’s assessment of the economic efficiency of the choice under 
review times the allocative-efficiency gain that that information would 
generate if it would critically affect the analyst’s conclusion about 
whether the choice under review was/would be economically efficient 
(on the naïve assumption that the decision whether to make any 
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relevant choice would be completely determined by the choice’s 
predicted economic efficiency, the economic-efficiency gain that 
would be generated by substituting the choice the additional research 
would cause to be made for the choice that would otherwise have been 
made [minus the allocative cost of revising the choice that would 
otherwise have been made]) plus (ii) the allocative benefits the relevant 
research-project would yield by increasing the accuracy of the 
estimates or guesstimates of the economic efficiency of other choices, 
and relatedly (C) the difference between the allocative-benefit and 
allocative-cost estimates in question (i.e., the ex ante allocative 
efficiency of each possible additional research project); 
27. execute the additional research projects estimated to be ex ante
economically efficient; 
28. repeat Steps (26) and (27) until no additional research project is
found to be ex ante economically efficient; and 
29. generate a final estimate of the economic efficiency of the choice
under review from the results of all the theoretical and empirical 
research that was available or was executed for the purpose of 
assessing the economic efficiency of the choice under review and 
guesstimates of the magnitudes of those parameters that have not been 
investigated sufficiently to be estimated and publish the relevant 
economic-efficiency conclusion together with a detailed account of the 
analyses that generated it. 
I anticipate that even those who are willing to admit that (what 
should I say?) my protocol is thorough (exhaustive and exhausting?) and 
perhaps even clever will dismiss it as impracticable. I have three 
responses. First, it is essential to recognize that I am not proposing that 
economic-efficiency analysts execute all the steps in this protocol 
perfectly or even as well as they could if one ignored the allocative cost 
of any such efforts; I am proposing that economic-efficiency analysts 
execute the protocol to a third-best-allocatively-efficient extent. Indeed, 
the previous sentence is somewhat miswritten in that my account of the 
protocol’s various relevant steps includes instructions that they be 
executed to a TBLE extent. Second, a self-serving assertion: I am 
confident that, in virtually all situations, some more-or-less-refined 
variant of this protocol will be third-best allocatively efficient—that the 
use of some variant of the protocol will increase economic efficiency if 
public choices are based to any insignificant degree on the economic-
efficiency conclusions it generates. Third, there is no justifiable 
alternative to this protocol (or to a version of this protocol that has been 
improved by further work). No-one has developed an alternative 
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protocol for predicting or postdicting the economic efficiency of a 
choice that responds defensibly to The General Theory of Second Best, 
and, I submit, no defensible alternative can be developed. Only one 
defensible course of action is available to economists and others who 
reject this protocol: admit that nothing reliable can be said about the 
economic efficiency of choices and recommend that choices be 
evaluated exclusively on such other grounds as their impact or 
distributive and/or corrective justice and/or the moral defensibility of the 
decision-procedure through which they were made. 
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF TAXING THOSE WHO ARE BETTER-
OFF THAN THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF THE RELEVANT SOCIETY TO 
FINANCE REDISTRIBUTIONS THAT REDUCE POVERTY AND/OR 
INCOME/WEALTH INEQUALITY 
Almost regardless of the distributive norm to which they 
individually subscribe, most economists claim that a trade-off must be 
made between equality and economic efficiency.14 I think that this 
conclusion is certainly contestable and probably wrong. Because I 
suspect that this issue is of more interest to the probable readers of this 
Symposium than are the fairly-technical analyses of Second-Best Theory 
and its implications that the rest of this Article has executed, I have 
decided to close this Article by analyzing the allegation that a trade-off 
must be made between equality and economic efficiency despite the fact 
that Second-Best Theory plays a relatively-small role in the relevant 
analysis. 
The traditional argument for the equality/economic-efficiency 
trade-off is first-best: 
1. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, the taxes on the margin of
earned income that would be levied to finance any transfers to the poor 
would misallocate resources by reducing the private benefit from 
supplying market labor (the net wage) below the allocative benefits the 
relevant labor would supply (which, on otherwise-Pareto-perfect 
assumptions, would equal the gross [before-tax] wage that workers 
would be paid), thereby causing potential suppliers of market labor to 
allocate from the perspective of economic efficiency too much time to 
the supply of do-it-yourself labor and the “production” of leisure and 
not enough time to the supply of market labor; 
2. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, the taxes on the margin of
14. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (The 
Brookings Institution, 1975).  
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unearned income that would be levied to finance any transfers to the 
poor would misallocate resources by reducing the private benefits from 
saving and investing (the net private returns to investment) below the 
allocative benefits that investment generates (on otherwise-Pareto-
perfect assumptions, the gross [before tax] returns to investment), 
thereby causing potential investors to misallocate resources both by 
saving and investing less than would be economically efficient and by 
supplying less market labor than would be economically efficient (to 
the extent that part of the private benefits from supplying such labor 
consists of the returns a worker can earn by saving and investing his or 
her wages); and 
3. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, those transfers to the poor
or to individuals with lower-than-societal-weighted-average income 
and wealth that increase when their income and wealth decrease or that 
increase with their illnesses and disabilities will tend to cause 
economic inefficiency by deterring their potential recipients from 
supplying economically-efficient market labor and from making 
economically-efficient decisions to save and invest and by inducing 
their potential recipients to make economically-inefficient general 
consumption, life-style, labor, and medical-care-consumption choices 
that increase the extent to which they suffer illnesses and disabilities 
that result in their receiving government transfers. 
All these arguments can be criticized for ignoring the relevance of 
the other Pareto imperfections that our economy contains. However, 
with minor exceptions, I think that even in our actual, highly-Pareto-
imperfect economy the redistributive policies whose economic 
efficiency these first-best arguments call into question do cause the 
categories of economic inefficiency such arguments are incorrectly used 
to “demonstrate” their cause. 
The reason why the standard economic claim that equality must be 
traded off against economic efficiency is at a minimum contestable and, 
I believe, wrong is not that the argument for that claim is first-best 
(ignores The General Theory of Second Best) but that it ignores the fact 
that poverty and/or income/wealth inequality generates economic 
inefficiency in at least seven ways. More specifically, the standard claim 
that equality must be traded off against efficiency is wrong because it 
ignores the fact that redistributions that reduce poverty and 
income/wealth inequality will increase economic efficiency by reducing 
the amount of economic inefficiency generated in the relevant economy 
because the poverty/wealth-income-inequality it contains (1) increases 
the amount of misallocation the economy generates because 
economically-efficient investments in the human capital of children and 
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adults are not made; (2) increases the amount of misallocation that 
consumption choices generate because it is advantageous for individuals 
when they are poor to make external-cost-generating consumption 
choices (e.g., to buy cheap, external-cost-generating cars and rent cheap, 
external-cost-generating housing units) whose consumption by them is 
economically inefficient); (3) increases the amount of misallocation 
generated because the relevant economy’s members make privately-
disadvantageous consumption choices that are economically 
inefficient—i.e., because (A) by damaging them neurologically (by 
affecting their mothers’ nutrition, physical health, and psychological 
state when they are in utero) and by reducing their preparedness for 
schooling and the quality of the education they receive both inside and 
outside schools, the poverty of the poor increases both the frequency 
with which the individuals who are poor fail to understand the attributes 
of products and their full cost to them and the frequency with which they 
do their math wrong or make consumption choices unthinkingly and (B) 
by increasing their frustration and unhappiness, the poverty of 
individuals who are poor leads them to discount future benefits too 
highly from the perspective of their own lifetime welfare; (4) increases 
the amount of misallocation that poverty causes by inducing individuals 
who are poor to make economically-inefficient decisions to perform 
dangerous, lawful labor in all the ways that it causes poor individuals to 
make economically-inefficient consumption-decisions that are not in 
their interest and, in a society in which poor individuals who have been 
injured at work or their families receive various types of government 
transfers for which their non-poor counterparts would not be eligible, by 
rendering economically-inefficient decisions to perform dangerous 
lawful labor profitable for those who make them or for their families; (5) 
increases the amount of misallocation that the people who are poor or 
have significantly less income and wealth than does the average 
participant in the relevant economy generate by engaging in 
economically-inefficient criminal activities, by making them less 
concerned about the impact of their criminal choices on their victims (by 
alienating them), by reducing the difference between the attractiveness 
of life in prison and life without successful crime outside prison, by 
causing them to use too high a discount rate to calculate the present 
value of their future welfare, and by causing them to be too optimistic 
about the profitability of crime for reasons other than the discount rate 
they apply to their future welfare; (6) reduces the political influence of 
the individuals who are poor or have lower-than-average income/wealth 
below the political influence of individuals who are not poor or who 
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have higher-than-average income/wealth and thereby increases the 
amount of economic inefficiency the government of the relevant society 
generates because its choices are based on a calculation that places a 
lower weight on the average dollar gained or lost by the individuals who 
are absolutely or relatively poor than on the average dollar gained or lost 
by the individuals who are not absolutely or relatively poor; and 
hopefully (7) increases the economic inefficiency the economy generates 
because its distribution of income and wealth dis-serves (on balance) the 
“external preferences” of the members of and participants in the society 
in question (their non-parochial preferences for the resources and 
opportunities that others have). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The General Theory of Second Best demonstrates that, in a 
situation in which one or more members of a set of sufficient conditions 
for the achievement of an optimum cannot or will not be fulfilled, there 
is no general reason to believe that choices that increase the extent to 
which the other members of the relevant set of sufficient conditions are 
fulfilled will even tend on that account to yield an improvement. In 
economics and Law & Economics, the optimum that is usually in play is 
maximizing economic efficiency, the relevant set of sufficient conditions 
for the maximization of economic efficiency is the set of Pareto-optimal 
conditions, and the basic negative corollary of The General Theory of 
Second Best is that the conventional economic-efficiency argument for 
increasing seller competition, decreasing monopsony, reducing 
externalities, lowering taxes on the margin of income, improving the 
product-attribute, product-performance, and full-product-purchasing-
cost information available to buyers, and increasing the extent to which 
resource allocators make the decisions that would best satisfy their 
preferences if they were perfectly informed cannot bear scrutiny because 
it assumes incorrectly, in contravention of The General Theory of 
Second Best, that the fact that no imperfection in seller competition, no 
monopsony, no externalities, no taxes on the margin of income, 
resource-allocator sovereignty, and resource-allocator maximization are 
Pareto-optimal conditions implies that, even in our inevitably-Pareto-
imperfect economy, choices that increase the extent to which each or all 
of these conditions is/are fulfilled will on that account increase economic 
efficiency. 
This Article delineates, explains, and illustrates The General 
Theory of Second Best, explains and outlines the protocol for economic-
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efficiency prediction and postdiction that I think responds economically 
efficiently to The General Theory of Second Best, and explains why, 
notwithstanding the consensus among economists to the contrary, 
tax/redistribution policies that reduce poverty and inequality are likely to 
increase economic efficiency. 
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